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Chapter One
Our Own Flesh and Blood
Putting the Body at the Center 
of Violence and Dehumanization
Krista K. Thomason
Talk of dehumanization has become so commonplace in our current political 
climate that the term threatens to become banal. Unfortunately, we seem to 
see ever-increasing examples of it happening in our world. Police violence, 
inhumane prison conditions, anti-immigration rhetoric, and rising numbers 
of displaced persons reflect a pressing need to not take the term for granted 
and also to recommit to theorizing about it. Attempting to explain and un­
derstand how average people—^people with no history of, or propensity to, 
violence—commit sometimes unspeakable acts of cruelty has long been 
the subject of discussions in a variety of academic fields including history, 
psychology, and philosophy. Dehumanization emerges from these discus­
sions as one of the proximate causes of violence. Put simply: if one person 
can dehumanize another person, it will be easier to commit violence against 
them. I will refer to this claim as the facilitative claim—that dehumanization 
facilitates violence.
My aim in this chapter is to better understand precisely how dehumaniza­
tion might facilitate violence. At first glance, the connection seems obvious: 
What else is there to know other than that the perpetrators no longer see their 
victims as human? How else would people be able to commit unspeakable 
violence against another person? Like many aspects of violence, however, 
what seems obvious at first glance starts to seem less obvious the closer we 
look. As philosopher Berel Lang has pointed out, although everyone agrees 
that genocide is morally wrong, we have no good account of its special moral 
wrongness—why is it worse than war or other kinds of mass killing?' My 
contention is that dehumanization needs a similar examination. Philosophers 
are particularly well-equipped to tackle this sort of problem because it is 
conceptual in nature. We are, in other words, looking for a good definition of
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dehumanization. In order to construct such a definition, there are at least two 
things we need to try to understand. First, we need further analysis regarding 
what it means to “see” someone as less than human. Does the perpetrator of 
violence literally look at another person and see an object or an animal? Is the 
perpetrator’s attitude toward the victim best understood as a form of hatred, 
callous disregard, or cold indifference? Even if we accept the claim that to 
dehumanize another is to see that person as less than human, we must still 
work to understand the precise nature of this complex attitude.
Second, we need to better understand precisely how dehumanization fa­
cilitates violence. For the purposes of this chapter, I will focus largely on this 
second piece, though I will say some things about the first as well. Several 
scholars have written about dehumanization, but in philosophical accounts 
there is disagreement about the facilitative claim. While some philosophers 
accept the facilitative claim, recent work has called it into question.^ Al­
though this debate is rich and varied, one undertheorized element is the role 
that bodies themselves play in this story. This absence should be surprising; 
after all, the fact that victims of dehumanization are visibly human poses 
an obvious challenge to the perpetrator who must convince herself that her 
victim is not fully human. Putting bodies at the center of this analysis will, I 
propose, raise important questions about our current accounts of dehumaniza­
tion. In order to do this sort of analysis, readers should be aware that I will 
discuss dehumanizing language and graphic depictions of violence in some 
detail. My purpose in doing so is certainly not to revel in the spectacle; rather, 
my intention is to show how the bodies and body parts of victims loom large 
in the minds and memories of their killers.
EMOTIONAL DISTANCE: DOGS OR DEVILS?
Accounts of dehumanization are varied and complex, and to properly recon­
struct the arguments in the literature would be a book chapter unto itself 
Instead of reconstructing any one account in full, I will use elements from 
several accounts to illustrate the main claims about how dehumanization 
facilitates violence. The first claim is that dehumanization either creates or 
inflates emotional distance between the dehumanized and the dehumanizer. 
This emotional distance arises from and is reinforced by the idea or belief 
that the victim is something other than human. Yet emotional distance can be 
described in at least two different ways; the victim is considered either sub­
human (more like a nonhuman animal or an object) or inhuman (more like a 
monster or a demon). U.S. Army veteran and military theorist Lt. Col. David 
Grossman, philosopher and U.S. Army veteran J. Glenn Gray, and philoso-
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pher David Livingstone Smith present key explanations of both subhuman 
and inhuman emotional distance, so I will briefly review their arguments.^
Regarding the subhuman description, Grossman argues that military train­
ing relies on creating “cultural distance” from the enemy in order to make it 
easier for soldiers to kill.'* Creating cultural distance involves emphasizing 
the differences between the soldiers’ culture and the enemy culture. The 
enemy culture’s practices and leaders are belittled, and the set of enemies is 
often assigned an offensive shorthand term (e.g., “Kraut” or “Jap”).^ During 
the Vietnam War (1955-1975, also known as the Resistance War Against 
America), for example, soldiers were encouraged to think of the enemy in 
terms of numbers—as a “body count,” which according to one veteran made 
killing them as easy as “stepping on ants.”*
Likewise, Gray explains that one of the ways the military distinguishes 
murder from killing in war is to create images of the enemy that make it easier 
to kill. One of those images is the enemy as a “peculiarly noxious kind of 
animal toward whom one feels instinctive abhorrence.”^ When we survey the 
kinds of animals that victims of mass atrocities are often compared to, we find 
support for Gray’s claim: victims are referred to as rats, snakes, pigs, dogs, 
cockroaches, worms, lice, and leeches.* Gray argues that such images were 
particularly prevalent in the minds of World War II soldiers who fought in the 
Pacific. Quoting Herman Wouk’s The Caine Mutiny, it was common to see 
the Japanese forces as “an invasion of large armed ants” rather than soldiers 
or human beings.** Seeing enemy troops in this way means they are “sought 
out to be exterminated, not subdued.”*® As such. Gray argues that soldiers 
who hold this image of the enemy are often “subject to rapid brutalization.”*' 
If enemy forces are merely pests that must be exterminated, then, unlike kill­
ing a human enemy, violence against them carries no consequences, costs, or 
moral ambiguity.
Yet seeing someone as subhuman is only one way emotional distance might 
be created or reinforced. By contrast, dehumanization might involve seeing 
someone as inhuman. Gray argues that the inhuman image of the enemy is 
closely related to the subhuman, but instead of seeing the enemy as pests, sol­
diers see the enemy as “a devil or at least demon-possessed.”*^ Devils and de­
mons in this view are embodiments of a larger evil. The soldier clinging to this 
image of the enemy shows “utter disregard for the individuality of the foe.”*^ 
If an individual member of the enemy group somehow behaves differently 
from the image, the soldier will not revise her view, but instead be “driven 
to discover motives for their behavior other than the apparent ones.”*'* Smith 
similarly argues that to dehumanize people is to think of them as “counterfeit 
human beings—creatures that look like humans, but who are not endowed 
with a human essence.”** Smith illustrates this possibility by reference to
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demonic possession and zombies. Both zombies and the possessed outwardly 
have human form, but have lost whatever inner feature makes them human.'*’ 
He writes: “To conceive of demonic possession you have to find it credible 
that a nonhuman spirit can inhabit a human body, and therefore that someone 
can be outwardly human, but inwardly demonic.The inhuman mode of de­
humanization treats the enemy not as an individual, but as “a representative of 
a principle of evil, and he is only an embodiment of this principle.”'* Similarly 
to the subhuman, killing the inhuman does not carry the same costs as killing 
humans. In fact, as Gray points out, this inhuman image of the enemy can lead 
the soldier to think that he is on a righteous mission against evil—“it instills 
in the soldier a conception of himself as an avenging angel. Every enemy 
killed is a win for the side of good against the side of evil.
Regarding both the subhuman and inhuman descriptions, the end result is 
supposed to be the same: seeing someone as subhuman or inhuman creates 
or strengthens the emotional distance needed to kill. Killing the subhuman 
enemy is no more terrible than killing rats, ants, or snakes. Killing the inhu­
man enemy is merely destroying the embodiment of a supernatural evil bent 
on human destruction. Both cases seem to support the facilitative claim: per­
petrators of violence can use these images to sufficiently distance themselves 
from the humanity of the people they kill.
HUMANISM AND DEHUMANIZATION
The facilitative claim—that dehumanizing someone makes it easier to kill 
them—rests on the assumption that seeing someone as human makes it hard 
to kill them. Philosopher Kate Manne refers to this assumption as the “hu­
manist” assumption, and has mounted an important critique of it.'^*’ Although 
the humanist assumption is a common and compelling one, it is far more 
difficult to explain precisely why seeing someone as human would make it 
hard to harm or kill that person. It is true that there is a great deal of psy­
chological evidence to suggest that humans both naturally sympathize with 
other humans and tend to anthropomorphize animals and objects that look 
sufficiently human.^' But, as Manne points out, to see someone as human 
does not automatically entail that we will be positively disposed or sympa­
thetic toward her:
For a fellow human being is not just an intelligible spouse, parent, child, sibling, 
friend, colleague, and so on, in relation to you and yours. She is also an intel­
ligible rival, enemy, usurper, insubordinate, betrayer, and so on . . . she is also 
someone who could coerce, manipulate, humiliate, or undermine you.“
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Worse, as Manne argues, someone’s humanity is often the source of violence 
against them rather than an obstacle to it. Manne demonstrates with the 2014 
case of Elliot Rodger, the Isla Vista murderer, who shot university sorority 
sisters at the University of California, Santa Barbara, killing six and injuring 
fourteen others. His motivation was revenge for what he saw as a wrongful 
refusal of affection. Manne writes, “Rodger ascribes to these women subjec­
tivity, preferences, and a capacity to form deep emotional attachments [. . .] 
he attributes to them agency, autonomy, and the capacity to be addressed by 
him.’’"^ Rodger holds women responsible for rebuffing his affections and the 
murders were ways of punishing them. These women were not dogs or devils 
to him; they were betrayers who were (in his mind) unjustifiably malicious 
toward him. Manne’s point is that human beings are equally capable of being 
hostile and violent toward other humans qua humans. Manne’s arguments 
suggest that we do not have to dehumanize someone to harm her. In fact, 
we can often explain violence in terms of humanity rather than in spite of it.
Manne’s critique of the humanist assumption calls into question the fa- 
cilitative claim. Indeed, contained within some accounts of dehumanization 
there are obvious counters to the facilitative claim. For instance, Grossman 
argues that soldiers are trained to gain “moral distance” from their enemies. 
Moral distance requires “the determination and condemnation of the enemy’s 
guilt” as well as “an affirmation of the legality and legitimacy of one’s own 
cause.”^'' Put simply, it is easier to kill someone if you believe he is a bad guy 
and you are a good guy. As Grossman points out, however, moral distance 
is not dehumanizing after all; “But the enemy is still human, and killing him 
is an act of justice rather than an act of extermination.”^^ Bad guys are fully 
human; they are just bad humans deserving of punishment.
Similarly, genocide and Holocaust scholar James Waller argues that per­
petrators of mass atrocity convince themselves that victims deserve their 
suffering.^* According to Waller, victim-blaming results from the common 
tendency for humans to believe in a just world: if the victims have done some­
thing to earn their suffering, then perpetrators will feel less hesitation about 
doling out just desserts.’^ One of the tenets of Nazi ideology, for example, 
was that Jews were part of some complex international conspiracy and thus 
deserved to be exposed and brought down.-* According to Waller, blaming 
victims is part of “a process of detachment by which some individuals or 
groups are placed outside the boundary within which moral values, rules, and 
considerations of fairness apply.”^’ Yet this claim is clearly false. To think of 
someone as deserving rightful punishment is to see that person as responsible 
for their actions, as possessing bad motives, and as capable of putting those 
bad motives into action. These are all traits that we attribute to human beings 
and not to cockroaches or otherworldly demons. To see your victim as a bad
26 Krista K. Thomason
person who deserves punishment is to precisely apply the rules of fairness 
to them. Like Elliot Rodger who believed women were being wrongly mali­
cious toward him, perpetrators of violence who see their victims as enemies, 
criminals, or deserving of blame still see them as humans.
If humans actually do not need to dehumanize others in order to do vio­
lence against them, why is dehumanizing language so common among per­
petrators? Manne argues that this sort of language could be easily attributed 
to an attempt to humiliate and assert dominance. She writes:
Given that human beings are widely held to be superior to nonhuman animals 
... denying someone’s humanity can serve as a particularly humiliating kind of 
put-down. When a White police officer in Ferguson called a group of [Bjlack 
political protestors “fucking animals” three days after Michael Brown’s death, 
he was using this trope to demean and degrade [B]lack people, and to re-assert 
his own dominance.^”
Rather than thinking of this sort of language as literally communicating that 
the speaker sees his victim as subhuman, we might instead think of it as an 
insult. Insulting someone doesn’t require that we don’t see that person as hu­
man. It only requires that we want to hurt them, degrade them, or make them 
feel bad about themselves. Insulting someone also allows us to reify our sense 
of ourselves as better than them or superior to them. Further, one naturally 
wonders how much of dehumanizing language involves rationalization and 
self-deception rather than actually seeing victims as subhuman or inhuman. 
Gray anticipates this possibility:
I suspect that at some level of consciousness many of these soldiers recognize 
their image to be false and that their rationalization is a way of making things 
easier for themselves. The foreign, strange, and uncanny only partially victim­
ize [the enemy]. They allow differences in language and customs and perhaps 
skin color to persuade them that internally the mind, emotions, and soul are also 
utterly unlike theirs.-'
Appeals to the differences between yourself and your victims are, in other 
words, relatively flimsy attempts to deny the obvious: your victim really 
is a human being. Within this view, dehumanizing victims has less to do 
with how the killers see the victims, and more to do with how the killers see 
themselves. If the victims are dogs or devils, then the perpetrators get to see 
themselves as fully human in spite of the inhumane violence they commit.
Those who favor the more straightforward interpretation of the facilita- 
tive claim have responses to Manne’s critique,’^ but her work shows that the 
relationship between dehumanization and violence is not as clear as it might
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have seemed. What does it really mean to see or not see someone as human? 
One undertheorized aspect of this question has been the human body itself. 
How is it that perpetrators can look at the face of another human being and 
see a dog or a devil? It seems they must find a way to deny what is right in 
front of them. Common interpretations of dehumanization will appeal to the 
complex process of rationalization that happens prior to the actual violence 
in order to answer this question. According to this explanation, perpetrators 
“Other” their victims by emphasizing physical or cultural differences or by 
repeatedly referring to them by nonhuman terms (e.g., nonhuman animals, 
vermin, or disease). Once this “Othering” occurs, perpetrators no longer see 
a human being standing in from of them.
Yet when we closely examine perpetrator testimony, we find accounts that do 
not support this story. Perpetrators of violence rarely see their victim’s bodies 
as mere matter, or as identical to the body of a nonhuman animal. In fact, in the 
moment of actual violence—^the kill itself—^perpetrators seem to be confronted 
forcefully with their victims’ humanity. It is the actual flesh and blood that dis­
turbs perpetrators and that haunts them after the physical violence is over.
BLOOD, EYES, AND BRAINS: 
DEHUMANIZATION AND THE BODY
Even those who accept the facilitative claim acknowledge that perpetrators 
of violence almost never assert that their victims do not look human. Smith 
illustrates with quotes from Heinrich Himmler, leader of the SS under Nazi 
rule and one of the architects of the Holocaust, found in the 1942 German 
magazine entitled Subhuman:
The subhuman is a biological creature, crafted by nature, which has hands, legs, 
eyes, and mouth, even the semblance of a brain. Nevertheless, this terrible crea­
ture is only a partial human being [...] Not all of those who appear human are 
in fact so. Although it has features similar to a human, the subhuman is lower 
on the spiritual and psychological scale than any animal. Inside of this creatures 
lie wild and unrestrained passions: an incessant need to destroy, filled with the 
most primitive desires, chaos and coldhearted villainy.^
Here Himmler clearly states that the subhuman will appear outwardly to be 
human. He must work to convince the reader that appearances are deceiving: 
despite their human appearance, subhumans are not on the same “spiritual and 
psychological scale” and inside them lies “chaos and coldhearted villainy.” 
Himmler focuses on internal characteristics to differentiate the subhuman 
from the human, but he cannot and does not deny that they will look the same.
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Himmler’s arguments are often echoed in the accounts of perpetrators of 
violence. Perpetrators will often claim that victims no longer seemed or felt 
human to them. One of the Hutu Interahamwe (a Kinyarwanda term referring 
to a paramilitary organization, that also encompasses civilian actors) from 
the Rwandan Genocide of 1994, for example, explains: “We no longer saw a 
human being when we turned up a Tutsi in the swamps. I mean, a person like 
us, sharing similar thoughts and feelings.”^'* Here we can see the same inner- 
outer distinction. The speaker claims that Tutsis were not human in the sense 
that they did not have similar thoughts and feelings. That is, despite the fact 
that they look human, they are not really human.
It thus appears that perpetrators somehow manage to ignore or look past 
the obvious fact that their victims look like humans, and convince them­
selves that they are not humans after all. Smith uses this phenomenon to 
support the claim that dehumanizers believe their victims are “counterfeit 
humans,” which is why they are able to commit violence against them: “If 
human-looking creatures are not really people, then we don’t have to treat 
them as people. They can be used instrumentally, with complete disregard 
for their human worth—they can be killed, tortured, raped, experimented 
upon, and even eaten.”^^ But further examination of perpetrator testimony 
raises questions about this narrative. In particular, when we focus on how 
perpetrators respond to the bodies of their victims, we should begin to doubt 
the extent to which they are able to ignore the fact that their victims look 
like humans.
First, let us return to Grossman’s combat soldiers. Grossman argues that 
long-range killing—using bombs, long-distance rifles, or grenades—lessens 
the negative responses that soldiers have to killing.^* Killing at a distance can 
allow soldiers to emotionally distance themselves from the fact that they are 
killing people: For instance, they can think of bombing “targets” rather than 
people. The closer the perpetrator is to the victim, the more difficult it is for 
her to convince herself that she is not killing someone. Close-range com­
bat—up-close shooting, stabbing, and hand-to-hand combat—does not allow 
for this rationalization. According to soldier testimony, killing in such cases 
usually involves a brief feeling of euphoria followed by an intense feeling 
of guilt, disgust, and horror.” After they kill, soldiers frequently vomit and 
cry; they are awestruck or horrified by the amount of blood, and they fixate 
on the eyes of their victims.” As Grossman puts it, “As men draw this near, 
it becomes extremely difficult to deny [the victims’] humanity. Looking in a 
man’s face, seeing his eyes and his fear, eliminate denial.””
We find similar reactions in interviews with the Hutu Interahamwe Irom 
the Rwandan Genocide. When asked about their first kills, three different 
perpetrators respond thus:
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Me, I was not scared of death. In a way, I forgot I was killing live people. I no 
longer thought about either life or death. But the blood struck terror into me.
It stank and dripped . . . Death did not alarm me, but that overflow of blood, 
that—yes, a lot.''"
At one point, I saw a gush of blood begin before my eyes, soaking the skin 
and clothes of a person about to fall ... I sensed it came from my machete. I 
looked at the blade, and it was wet. I took fright and wormed my way along to 
get out, not looking at the person anymore. I found myself outside, anxious to 
go home.'"
I do remember the first person who looked at me at the moment of the deadly 
blow ... The eyes of someone you kill are immortal, if they face you at the fatal 
instant. . . They shake you more than streams of blood.''^
As with those of the combat soldiers, we see particular themes emerging 
in these accounts. Seeing the victim’s flowing blood seems to be upsetting. 
Looking victims in the eyes is memorable and horrifying. These memories 
are notably visceral and physical. It is not, for example, memories of their 
victims as friends and neighbors or other personal connections that cause the 
perpetrators anxiety or guilt. Instead, it is victims’ blood and their eyes—it is 
their outward, bodily characteristics that are the most bothersome.
Finally, we see similar themes emerge in two very different cases from 
the Holocaust. Historian Christopher Browning details the activities of the 
Einsatzgruppen (German for “task forces” or “operational groups”) Reserve 
Battalion 101, which was the Nazi military unit tasked with the 1942 Jozefow 
massacre in Poland.'*^ They were tasked with shooting their victims in the 
back of the head at point-blank range.'*'* In subsequent firsthand accounts, one 
disturbing image arises over and over; if the shooter did not aim properly, 
the victim’s head would explode.'*® Soldiers attest that “brains and bones flew 
everywhere,” that “blood, bone splinters, and brains sprayed everywhere and 
besmirched the shooters,” and that “shooters were gruesomely besmirched 
with blood, brains, and bone splinters [which] hung on their clothing.”'*" 
After these types of executions, more and more of the soldiers asked to be 
reassigned, busied themselves with other tasks to get out of the shooting, or 
started sneaking off just to be alone.'**' They drank heavily and had night- 
mares."*® Although some soldiers had trouble with the fact that they had to 
shoot women and children, the goriness of the executions is the more vivid 
detail that recurs in their accounts.
At the other end of the chain of Nazi command, we find Franz Stangl, 
the notorious commandant at Treblinka, an extermination camp located in 
Poland. When journalist Gitta Sereny asks him whether he saw his victims as 
human beings, he says he thought of them as, “Cargo ... I rarely saw them
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as individuals. It was always a huge mass.”''* And yet further details emerge 
that bear similarities with the other firsthand accounts we have seen. Years 
later, after the war, Stangl tells the story of seeing cows out the window of 
a train. They come up to the fence to look at the train and Stangl thinks to 
himself, “Look at this; this reminds me of Poland; that’s just how the people 
looked, trustingly, just before they went into the tins . . . Those big eyes . . . 
which looked at me ... not knowing that in no time they’d all be dead.”^“ Like 
the Interahamwe and the combat soldiers, Stangl remembers clearly the eyes 
of his victims: he sees them as trusting and innocent. Although Stangl seems 
to be drawing parallels between cattle and his human victims, he is clearly 
disturbed by the memory; Sereny writes that in retelling the story he looks 
“old and worn and real.”^'
THE DEHUMANIZED BODY 
AND THE FACILITATIVE CLAIM
According to one interpretation of the facilitative claim, perpetrators do not 
believe their victims are human—they only look human. If dehumanization 
relies on internal rather than external qualities to determine who is subhuman, 
why should close contact with the subhuman shake those judgments? It seems 
as though it should not: if I am assured, for example, that a particularly life­
like wax figure is not in fact human, why should I doubt that once I get up 
close to it? If the dehumanizer accepts that what differentiates human from 
subhuman is an imperceptible internal difference, it should seem puzzling 
that perpetrators fixate on the physical characteristics of their victims. As 
Gray points out, if victims are devils, they will likely fake humanlike reac­
tions: “Like all devils, the enemy is deceiving and deceitful. He can feign 
mercy or fairness [. . .] trust cannot be aceorded to him.”” The dehumanized 
are only supposed to appear human; their physical appearance is supposed 
to be a charade, a clever trick, or an illusion. Why, then, are people who do 
violence to them haunted by their blood, eyes, and brains?
We might be tempted to explain this phenomenon simply by appeal to 
disgust. The gory aspects of killing are just that: gory. It is a eommon human 
response to be disgusted by bodily fluids and detached body parts. Why not 
simply think perpetrators’ responses are disgust reactions? Although disgust 
might be a part of their responses, their reactions cannot be reduced to dis­
gust. Suppose, for example, that people in an emergency waiting room see 
a very wounded patient covered in blood and with serious bodily injuries. 
We might expect those in the waiting room to be disgusted and horrified. 
They may even have trouble getting the images out of their heads as time
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passes. But being disturbed by such a sight still does not seem to capture the 
responses of the perpetrators. The perpetrators are haunted by the memories 
and images of bodies, even years later. Their reaction is more similar to a 
traumatic response than a disgust response.^
The soldiers of the Einsatzgruppen, for example, were psychologically un­
done by the point-blank executions. Both Eichmann and Himmler report that 
the soldiers were on the brink of madness.*'* What is more, the bodies of their 
victims seem to carry more meaning for them than disgust reactions would 
indicate. One of the Hutu Interahamwe remarks: “The eyes of the killed, for 
the killer, are his calamity if he looks into them. They are the blame of the 
person he kills.”** Likewise, Stangl sees trust and innocence in the cows, 
which is what reminds him of Poland. The blood, eyes, and brains of the 
victims are not simply human tissue. For the perpetrators, these things seem 
to be both obvious indicators of the humanity of their victims and evidence 
of the horror of their own actions.
What should perhaps be most striking about the way that perpetrators re­
spond to the bodies of their victims is that they never seem to think of their 
victims’ bodies as mere bodies or mere physical matter. First, as Manne 
points out, rape is common in the vast majority of mass atrocities.** If per­
petrators fully thought of their victims as dogs or devils, rape in this context 
would be as taboo and strange as raping a nonhuman animal or as raping a 
human-looking demon or zombie. Additionally, torture is likewise common, 
and yet if victims were merely pests to be exterminated, torture would also 
seem bizarre. Few people think to torture rats, cockroaches, or lice even as 
they exterminate them. Even when perpetrators are encouraged to think of 
their victims in terms of “cargo” or “body counts,” the victims’ physical ap­
pearance is often what disrupts this rationalization. For the Hutu aggressors, 
seeing the flowing blood of their victims destroys the illusion of the Tutsis as 
just a mass of creatures. As Grossman puts it, the physical and bodily aspects 
of killing are the things that “eliminate denial.”*^
It would be a mistake, however, to expect that just because perpetrators 
see the bodies of their victims as human they therefore always experience 
sympathy for them. As Manne argues, human beings can see each other 
as hostile, hateful, and threatening while still seeing each other as fully 
human. Combat soldiers often desecrate the bodies of their victims. For 
example, as journalist Kevin Sites shares of his interview with a Marine 
who fought in the Vietnam War, experienced his men crucifying an enemy 
Viet Cong soldier: “They got bamboo that was lying around, made a cross 
. . . My men crucified the soldier after they stripped him naked.”** Corpses 
were maimed, burned, and posed in macabre tableaus. Combat soldiers 
took souvenirs of teeth and skulls. It’s tempting to see such desecration
